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THE CRISIS OF THE 70's-WHO WILL
MANAGE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT?
CHARLES C. MULCAHY*

Ten years ago a mere handful of states had laws permitting or
requiring municipal governments to "meet and confer" or bargain
collectively with their employees. Few states had legislation authorizing municipal employees to organize or join unions. In fact, many
states had laws forbidding such activity. Today only eight states
have no legislation regarding union activity in the public sector,'
and only two states still have legislation expressly prohibiting it.2
The phenomenon of collective bargaining in municipal employment
has spread throughout the United States in a nearly unprecedented
legislation explosion. As of May, 1970, forty states had legislation
authorizing some form of union activity by public employees, although in the majority of states, it is still limited in scope. The concepts and interpretations of employee rights are nearly as numerous
as the states which have enacted legislation recognizing such rights.
It is the confusion bred by this variety of state laws coupled with
the lack of preparedness and experience on the part of municipal
government administrators in dealing with the united front of organized labor unions that is precipitating the municipal labor crisis of
the 70's. This crisis is best expressed by asking the question, "Who
will manage municipal government?"
Some order and understanding may be gained by grouping public employment relations legislation into three categories: (1) Mandatory legislation which requires public employers to negotiate
with their employees;3 (2) Permissive legislation which authorizes
*
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' Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West
Virginia.

2 N.C.

GEl.

STATs.

§§ 95-85 to 95-88 (1965) ; TEx. ANN. Civ.

STAT.

art. 5154c.

(Vernon 1971).
3 In early 1971, twenty-six states had mandatory statutes requiring either meet
and confer or collective bargaining relationships. The states are Alaska
(teachers) ; California (state and local; teachers) ; Connecticut (teachers;
local); Delaware (local; state and county; transit); Florida (teachers;
county firemen) ; Hwaii (state, county and local) ; Idaho (firemen) ; Louisiana
(public transit) ; Maine (local and county) ; Maryland (teachers) ; Massachusetts (state and local) ; Michigan (local) ; Minnesota (state and local;
teachers) ; Missouri (all except police and teachers) ; Motana (nurses);
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public employers to negotiate with their employees ;4 and (3) mimimal legislation which affords public employees only minimal rights.5
Mandatory and permissive statutes often incorporate the term "meet
and confer" which is a legislative euphumism for something short
of collective bargaining.6 The overwhelming trend of the legislation is to grant employees in the public sector organizational and
collective bargaining rights that approach or equal those enjoyed by
employees in the private sector, including the right to strike. The
most recent public employment legislation limits the right to strike
only to employees providing critically essential services or only after
mandatory settlement procedures have failed to reseolve the dispute.7
Wisconsin has traditionally been one of the leaders in the crucial
area of public employee relations, having enacted the first compreNevada (local and teachers) ; New Hampshire (state) ; New Jersey (state and
local); New oYrk (state and local) ; North Dakota (teachers); Oregon
(state and local; teachers; nurses); Pennsylvania (state and local); Rhode
Island (local; fire; police; teachers; and state) ; Vermont (state; teachers) ;
Washington (state and local; teachers) ; Wisconsin (local except police;
state) ; and Wyoming (firemen).
4 In early 1971, eleven states had permissive statutes, making meet and confer
or collective bargaining relationships permissible. They are: Alaska (state,
local) ; Delaware (local) ; Florida (teachers) ; Illinois (state, transit; universities) ; Kentucky (state) ; Nebraska (teachers) ; New Hampshire (city) ;
New Mexico (transit) ; South Dakota (state and ocal) ; Vermont (city) ; and
IAashington (public utilities).
5 In early 1971, fourteen states had the minimal type of statute, under which a
limited number of employees have only basic rights, such as the right to join
a union or present proposals to the employer. Eight of these states have only
minimal statutes: Alabama (firemen) ; Arizona (state and local) ; Arkansas
(state and local) ; Indiana (teachers) ; Iowa (state and local) ; Kansas
(teachers) ; and Utah (state and local). Six of the states which have minimal
statutes for certain employees, have comprehensive statutes for others. These
states and their minimal statutes are Florida (state and local) ; Illinois (firemen) ; Missouri (state and local) ; Nebraska (firemen) ; North Dakota (state
and local) ; and California (firemen).
(Footnotes 3, 4 and 5 contain material from 2 Lab. Rel. Law Sec., A.B.A. Rep.
at 94-100 (1970) reprinted with permission.)
r The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted "meet and negotiate in good faith"
provisions of the Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act (see note 8,
infra) as not requiring a school board to "bargain collectively," saying that the
statutory duty of a school board was different in regard to negotiation than
that of a private sector employer. Joint School District No. 8, City of Madison
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 37 Wis. 2d 483, 488, 155 N.W. 2d
78, 80 (1967).
7 See Public Employe Relations Act, Act. No. 195, PENN. LAWS 1970; 359
GERR B-9 and E-1 (1970).
This law extends bargaining rights to all state, county and municipal employees and grants them the right to strike, limited so that it can be employed
only after good faith compliance with dispute settlement procedures and in
absence of danger to public health and safety. A further limitation specifically
denies the right to strike to prison and mental hospital guards and court

employees.

Also, see Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, Act 171 LAWS OF
HAwAII (1970); 349 GERR B-9 and F-1 (1970). This law is the first public
employment law authorizing a strike. It requires a cooling off period, encourages use of settlement procedures and is limited when public health or
safety is endangered.
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hensive public employee bargaining law in 1959.' In its original
form, the Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act was a
simple pronouncement of the right of public employees to meet and
confer with their employers on matters concerning wages, hours
and conditions of employment. Subsequent amendments provided
for exclusive recognition of certified bargaining representatives,
authorized written agreements and established machinery for third
party intervention by way of mediation or fact finding in impasse
situations as a vehicle for the resolution of bargaining disputes.
This mechanism was intended to supplant the right to strike-a
right zealously protected in private employment,' but denied to public employees. 10 At the present time there is a bill pending before
the Wisconsin State Assembly which would make sweeping changes
in subchapter 4 of the Wisconsin Municipal Employees Relations
Act."' Among these changes would be the elimination of the strike

8"Right of Municipal Employes to Organize and Join Organizations; Bargain-

ing in Municipal Employment," Wis. STAT. sub. ch. IV, ch. 111, § 111.70 (1959)
as amended in 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967 and 1969.
9 "Injunctions; Conditions of Issuance; Restraining Orders (1) No court nor
any judge or judges thereof shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
as defined in section 103.62, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses
in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of the
allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition
thereto, if offered, and except after findings of all the following facts by the
court or judge or judges thereof;
(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and will
be executed or continued unless restrained;
(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property
will follow unless the relief requested is granted;
(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be
inflicted upon complainant by the denial thereof than will be inflicted
upon defendants by the granting thereof;
(d) That the relief to be granted does not violate the provisions of
section 103.53;
(e) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(f) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection".
Wis. STATS. § 103.56(1) (1969). Section 103.56 also imposes bonding requirements on parties seeking its relief.
1o "Strikes Prohibited. Nothing contained in this subchapter shall constitute a
grant of the right to strike by any county or municipal employe and such
strikes are hereby expressly prohibited." Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4) (1) (1969).
This statutory provision was originally enforced in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County in the case of County of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County
District Council #48, AFSCME, AFL-C10, et. al., Milwaukee County Circuit
Court Case 342-526 (1966). Although this court hearing admitted extensive
testimony concerning the substantial dangers to the public health, safety and
welfare if the strike by Milwaukee County General Hospital workers continued, the decision explicitly stated that strikes by public employees for any
reason were expressly prohibited citing Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4) (1) and extensive authority from numerous jurisdictions to that effect. (Also see City oi
LaCrosse v. LaCrosse Education Association, et. al., LaCrosse County Circuit
Court Case No. 28699(1971).)
"Assembly Bill 198 (1971). This Bill and amendments were introduced by
Committee on Labor by request of Wis. Council of County & Municipal
Employes; Milwaukee District Council 48; Wis. Professional Policemen's
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prohibition and the creation of an agency shop or fair share agreement concept.
Originally legislation of this type created a tremendous furor in
public employment due to its apparent confrontation with the sovereignty of government. Based upon the number of states enacting
this legislation, a definite trend has developed where public employees in most states now have collective bargaining rights (with limitations in specific sectors of employment). In certain areas the relationship between public management and its employees has stabilized. In others, the relationship has completely deteriorated. This
deterioration has been caused by both management and the unions.
For example, in 1970, then Governor Claude Kirk of Florida issued
an executive order providing that all forms of collective bargaining
with public employee units be expressly forbidden and that he would
veto any legislation attempting to grant such bargaining rights. 12
This order incurred the wrath of most municipal labor leaders and
further shocked many government officials engaged in this area.
The impact might have been different if collective bargaining had
not been in process in some areas of that state. However, once the
bargaining relationship had been established, it was almost impossible to effectively issue an order of this type. As an example of union contribution to the deterioration in the bargaining relationship,
attention may be directed to the state of New York where public
employment strikes are almost a daily occurrence. Many municipalities are complacently accepting their adjustment to the new reAssn.; Professional Firefighters of Wis.; Wis. Education Assn.; Wis. County
Police, Deputy Sheriff's & Radio Operators Assn. Repeals and recreates subch.
IV of ch. 111, the municipal labor relations law. Eliminates all exceptions in
law for policemen and law enforcement officers. Provides for "fair share
agreements" between municipal employers and unions if approved by 2/3 of
employes in unit by referendum whereby employer deducts union dues from
union mmbers, and from nonunion members that part of union dues attributable to union collective bargaining expense and "contract administration" and
makes failure to abide by agreement a prohibited practice. Defines supervisor
and provides that only officers immediately below fire chief or police chief in
rank can be considered supervisors in those departments. Supervisors may
belong to the same union as subordinates but cannot represent union in bargaining or grievances. Municipal employers authorized to submit to binding
arbitration, and 3-year agreements are permitted. Imposes duty to bargain on
municipal employes and employers and makes refusal to bargain a prohibited
practice. Makes agreements to arbitrate subject to ch. 298 (court enforces
arbitration award [private labor arbitration agreements are specifically excepted
from ch. 298]). Requires parties to notify each other and WERC of action on
fact finder's recommendations and provides for WERC order to show cause
proceeding if dispute continues unresolved 30 days after fact finder's report.
Authorized mediation of disputes on action of WERC or by request of either
party. Eliminates authority of municipalies to hire labor negotiators. Eliminates
authority of municipality to adopt local fact finding ordinance. Authorizes
WERC to adopt rules for dispute settlement procedures in local agreements.
Makes action by municipal employer issuing or seeking to issue contracts, including statutory (teachers') contracts, during collective bargaining, mediation,
fact finding or arbitration, a prohibited practice.
12Fla. Exec. Order of May 13, 1970; 350 GERR B-10 and F-1 (1970).
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lationship, basing this acceptance upon their ability to settle negotiations within reasonable cost prospectives and at the same time avoiding
municipal strikes. However essential these objectives are, they do not
protect the future management and operation of government.
PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT

The critical issue is whether government will retain the right to
govern itself. Stated more simply, will the people who elect the
representatives in government continue to control that same government? The purpose of this article is not to recommend or urge
that municipal labor matters be returned to the era when municipal employers unilaterally decided all matters involving wages,
hours and conditions of employment. Rather, the author recognizes
that public employee bargaining has eliminated many personnel
abuses prevalent before public management was forced to justify its
personnel relations. It is also recognized that bargaining in public
employment became an accepted process due to the large and cumbersome nature of many government units. Public employees
needed a spokesman to fight through the maze of commissions,
committees and elected governmental units.
The crisis has been caused by past and present employment
practices and the negotiation of past and present municipal labor
agreements. Many communities have steadfastly compromised the
management rights of municipal employers. It can easily be deepened by future employment practices and negotiations of labor
agreements. This erosion has laid the foundation for the municipal
labor crisis of the 1970's-public employee organizations' attempt
to co-manage government with their municipal employers. This
crisis stems from the basic union philosophy to negotiate every conceivable area which directly or indirectly affects the work force in
the bargaining unit (and sometimes out of the bargaining unit),
causing a direct confrontation with the rights of management to
manage.
UNIONS DENY Tis

OBJECTIVE

Many public employee unions state that they are not interested
in co-managing any government unit. They are not interested in
determining whether government should create a new program,
construct a new building or build a new park. Rather, as they state,
they are only interested in wages, hours and conditions of employment. Based upon a practical experience prospective, however,
under the term "conditions of employment" a consistent demand
has been made in many government units to meet, confer and, in
effect, negotiate reorganizations, new positions and related changes.
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By the time all of these matters have been resolved, the union is
intimately involved in the management prerogatives of determining
the nature and level of services to be provided to the community.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS HAVE FURTHER LIMITED MANAGEMENT

In addition to attempting to be involved in and to help direct
changes and/or new programs in municipal government, other encroachments have been exercised by public employees. A recent example involved the Professional Policemens' Protective Association
of Milwaukee and the City of Milwaukee.13 The policemen petitioned for a declaratory ruling on whether the rules and regulations
of the Police Department of the City of Milwaukee should be considered as having a bearing upon the wages, hours and conditions
of employment of certain law enforcement individuals in the bargaining unit represented by the Association. The decision of the
vWisconsin Employment Relations Commission stated that rules
established by the Chief of Police for the regulation of his department and for the governing of the police officers therein which affect
the wages, hours and conditions of employment of such officers are
proper subjects of negotiation between the representative of such
officers and the City of Milwaukee, regardless of whether said rules
and regulations were promulgated by the City of Milwaukee or the
Chief of Police, since the latter is an agent of the City of Milwaukee.
Police departments in the past had been considered para-military
in nature and the decisions of the Chief not subject to challenge by
anyone. Thus this case involved a major inroad in an area which
hadl customarily been considered absolute with respect to management authority. On January 24, 1971, following several months of
negotiations, the City of Milwaukee sustained its first strike by
policemen. The refusal to report for work was referred to by all
parties concerned as "the blue flu." One of the prime issues in this
"job action" involved the attempt on the part of the Milwaukee
Professional Policemen's Protective Association to negotiate the
operating rules of the Chief of Police. Whether the items requested
for negotiation were reasonable is not the issue. Rather, it is the
fact that a police union would contract blue flu over a non-economic item.
In another interesting case involving Local 594, Milwaukee Disttrict Council 48, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, a similar position was taken
by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. 14 During the
year 1969, the Milwaukee County Welfare Department commenced
13Professional Policemen's Protective Association of Milwaukee, WERC Dec.
9429; aff'd. Dane County Circuit Court Case No. 129-468 (1970).
14Local 594, Milwaukee District Council 48, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, WERC
Dec. 9754.
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a review of its operations to consider the possibility of reorganizing the department to relieve the professional welfare worker
from the tedious routine clerical work associated with the determination of eligibility for aid under its various programs. The ultimate
recommendation of the personnel and fiscal experts of the County
was to create a new job classification of "case aide" to handle the
routine clerical work and thereby allow the professional social workers to engage in purely professional activities. In addition to this
functional readjustment, there was the further incentive of complying with the 1967 amendment to the Social Security Act regarding the treatment of welfare cases to enable the County to continue
to share in federal funding to the maximum degree possible under
the Act. The Union objected to Milwaukee County's unilateral
establishment of the "case aide" position and insisted that it had
the right to engage in bargaining with respect to all aspects of the
position. Although the areas in which the union felt negotiations
were mandatory varied from time to time, the thrust of its argument was that in addition to normal wage and hour patterns, the
County was required to bargain the number of positions to be
created, the duties of the position, qualifications of applicants for
the positions and the relationship that the case aide positions would
bear to professional positions in the department and in determining
the need, classification, title and recruiting techniques. The County
and the Union met for nearly one year in a voluntary attempt to
work out a mutually agreeable plan for the creation of the "case
aide" positions. When it became apparent to the union that the
County was not going to follow the union's blueprint for the welfare department "case aides," Local 594 filed a petition with the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission to initiate a fact
finding proceeding with respect to the features of the "case aide"
positions previously mentioned. The County resisted the union's
petition on the ground that the creation of new positions was not
negotiable and that items the union sought to subject to bargaining
were not conditions of employment but rather conditions for employment. On June 24, 1970, the Commission issued its decision in which
it held that the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the
"case aide" positions were negotiable.15 The WERC further held
that the County had refused to negotiate these items and therefore
appointed Professor Gerald Somers of the University of Wisconsin
faculty as a fact finder to make preliminary recommendations. The
County immediately petitioned the Circuit Court of Dane County
to review the determination of the Commission. However, the petition for review in Wisconsin does not automatically stay the pro'5

District Council 48, Local No. 594, AFSCME, WERC Dec. 9904.
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ceedings sought to be reviewed,1 6 so the fact finding hearings proceeded without delay, pending appeal. On August 28, 1970, Professor Somers issued his opinion recommending that the intake functions should not be assigned to "case aides" but rather to professional case workers. This recommendation effectively creates a precedent that assignment of work to employees in a bargaining unit
may be subject to negotiation and fact finding. The impact of such
a trend in municipal labor relations is significant as well as alarming.1
DILEMINIA OF THE MUNICIPALITY

One of the dilemmas faced by any municipality involved in complicated reorganizations or other changes in its governmental structures, such as modernization of existing facilities, is that any meetings conducted with employee organizations in an attempt to explain the proposed changes have frequently been interpreted as admissions on the part of the individual municipality that the items
discussed were subject to bargaining. The character of such meetings, therefore, should be clearly identified in writing to the employee organization in order to rebut any such presumption. Another frustration of the municipal employer is that apparently any
employee organization seeking fact finding over an issue which it
feels is negotiable cannot be restrained by pending judicial review. s
In other words, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
has taken the position that following its determination that certain
items are subject to bargaining, a fact finder can be appointed to
proceed with the hearings to determine what should have resulted
from the bargaining while an appeal may be pending to determine
whether or not the particular area is a proper subject of bargaining.
16 WIs. STAT. § 227.17 (1969).
17 Certain recent trial court proceedings have injected the courts into the bargaining process. In these cases where public employee strikes occurred, the
court, when presented with a temporary restraining order or petition for
temporary injunction, attempted to mediate a settlement between the parties.
Although mediation by the courts in the past has resulted in distinct advantages
in resolving disputes between parties in all types of cases, such mediation
attempts when forced upon municipalities may be contrary to their express
rights under Visconsin state law. (See City of West Allis v. West Allis - West
Milwaukee Teachers Association, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Cases No.
386-591 and 387-044 (1970).)
This situation is further complicated by the reluctance of trial courts in the
State of Wisconsin (in the absence of a Supreme Court decision to clarify
the question although it would appear that the state law is specific) to issue
either temporary restraining orders or temporary injunctions without proof of
substantial danger to public health, safety or welfare. This appears to be only
the test in the private sector, however, certain trial courts have discussed this
test in public employment cases. (See City of Milwaukee v. Professional
Policemen's Protective Association of Milwaukee, et. al., Milwaukee County
Circiut Court Case No. 386-372 (1970) and Regents of the University of Wisconsin on behalf of University of Wisconsin v. Teaching Assistants Asssociation, et. al., Dane County Court Case No. 130-095 (1970).)
18 Note 16, supra.
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This position further compounds the problems of the municipality.
Another problem is the role of supervisors in employee units.
Some do not consider this a disadvantage. Two students of labor
relations, I. B. Helburn and Stephen R. Zimmer of the University
of Texas published an article in January, 1971 issue of Public Personnel
Review. 19 In that publication they suggest that active participation of
supervisors in unions representing their subordinates might foster
sound labor relations by providing a forum for the interchange of
ideas between supervisors and employees, thereby making it possible for the supervisors to know what was on their employee's
mind, in order to take corrective action before minor complaints
blossom into full grown formal grievances. 20 Although arguments
can be made for the value of maintaining good communications, including an interchange of ideas between supervisors and employees
in the bargaining unit, it is not necessary for supervisors to hold
leadership positions in the union to accomplish this objective.
The right of supervisory employees in public employment to
continue their union membership has been alleged to be a basic
constitutional right. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission has refused to take any position concerning mere union
membership by supervisory employees in the absence of court
action to determine the constitutionality of this position. 21 While
distinguishing mere union membership from inclusion in the bargaining unit, the WERC does take position that supervisory employees must be excluded from the bargaining unit itself. Although
Wisconsin Statutes, Section 111.70(1) (b) does not expressly exclude supervisors from the definition of employees, the WERC has
administratively determined that they are not entitled to the protections or privileges of the act. A municipal employer may voluntarily recognize and bargain with a supervisors organization. In no
case may supervisory personnel be included in a bargaining unit
representing employees whom they supervise.
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission set forth
the following rationale:
Should supervisors be included in the same bargaining unit
with employees they supervise, said individuals would be in
a position to either prefer the interest of the employees over
that of the municipal employer or to prefer the interest of the
municipal employer as the agents thereof over the employees.
Supervisors are generally responsible for the direction of the
work force, the maintenance of discipline and processing of
routine grievances. We do not believe that supervisors can
Is 384 GERR A-1 (1971).
20 City of Cudahy and International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1801,
21

WERC Dec. 9381; 2 Lab. Rel. Law Sec., A.B.A. Rep. 102 (1970).
City of Wausau Public Works, WERC Dec. 6276.
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properly carry out such responsibilities if they were included
in the bargaining unit."
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

Many labor experts claim that the erosion of management rights
in the public employment area should not be cause for alarm as
this is a natural preliminary step to the establishment of a sound
bargaining relationship. They point to the private sector where
battles over management rights have been waged for over twentyfive years in an effort to establish good working relationships, yet
these private firms have continued to flourish. In the 1930's, however, critical tactical errors were made in the area of management
rights, and today these errors continue to hamstring many American industries. Settlements were reached during those years based
primarily upon economic factors (profit vs. wages) and little regard
was placed upon preservation of management rights. Had sufficient
care been taken at that time, many of the current frustrations of
management in private industry would have been avoided. Comparisons with private industry in the area of management rights
are pertinent. Certain inherent differences are present between the
public and private sector:
1. Government operates without a profit motive.
2. Government units are required by law to continue to operate (unless consolidated, or to the extent that certain of
their services are discontinued).
3. Government normally does not run the risk of going bankrupt. It merely raises the tax levy.
4. Government provides many unique services which constitute critical and essential monopolies in the community.
Government therefore by its unique nature must exercise extreme
caution in avoiding personnel entanglements which would curtail
essential government services.
SOLVING THE MANAGEMENT RIGHTS PROBLEM

The apparent trend of invading government rights must be met
by municipalities to preserve their operational effectiveness. The
first step is the development of effective personnel programs and
procedures; the second is the negotiation of a definitive management rights clause. Unfortunately, many municipalities engage in
"management by crisis." They fail to recognize that the greatest
opportunity for structuring a sound personnel program occurs before
any trouble commences.
22 Krause, Robert E. "Administration Labor Agreements in the Public Service:
A Report on Hartford, Connecticut"; Peterson, B.H."; Cohen, Leonard
"Living with the Contract", Making the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Work Kenneth 0. Warner, ed. PERL No. 14, Chicago, Public Personnel
Association, 1970.
Mulcahy, A Municipality's Rights and Rresponsibilities Under the Wisconsin
Municipal Labor Law, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 512 (1966).
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The development of a sound personnel program is the most effective means of retaining strong but fair management rights. The
initial planning of the personnel program should include the establishment of set procedures, administered by responsible individuals,
to handle personnel problems. Several treatises have been written
summarizing recommended procedures concerning the establishmnt of such a plan. 23 Basically the development of this personnel
program involves the following key areas:
1. Negotiation of a comprehensive and protective written
collective bargaining agreement setting forth the precise
authority of management to conduct the business of that
particular government unit.
2. Development of a specific plan for administration of these
contracts once they are negotiated and executed. This
would include the development of specific grievance procedures to effectively and fairly decide grievances and to
establish a forum to discuss personnel problems. In large
government units the personnel officers of the various departments can meet to discuss uniform handling of grievances, application of work rules and bargaining objectives
in the next contract session. In small government units,
the employees vested with the personnel function can meet
with other personnel officers in surrounding communities
to interchange data. It would be a mistake to assume that
the unions are not already exchanging this type of information.
3. Development of a comprehensive strike plan. Whenever a
union recognizes that a municipality cannot "take a strike"
24
that municipality's bargaining position is weakened.
4. Careful, precise exercise of the provisions to avoid modification by usage. The finest labor agreements ever negotiated are only as effective as the line supervisory and
management people who administer them. The application
of a particular contract provision in the work setting will
become the rule of the case even though its application is
contrary to the intent of the draftsman.
5. Insistance upon a strong management rights clause. Obviously a management rights clause must be negotiated in
the contract. When municipal employees are negotiating
for their first contract, an outstanding opportunity is presented to incorporate a strong management rights clause,
since the employees are happy to get any contract at all.
If the clause is not included in the initial contract, the situation is more complex. The union takes the position that
management rights are negotiable.
Several government units in the past have taken the position that
management rights clause are unnecessary, relying upon the "resi-

23
24

C.D. Saso, Coping with Public Einployee Strikes (1970).
48 Wis. 2d 272, 179 N.W. 2d 805 (1970).
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dual rights" doctrine. This theory assumes that all rights to manage are inherent in government and that any rights not specifically
bargained away in a municipal labor contract are retained. Unfortunately, a steady stream of arbitration cases has watered down the
residual rights doctrine so that in the absence of a strong management rights clause the municipality is vulnerable to attack..2 3 There
have been certain exceptions to this view. The recent case of Libby,
2

McNeill and Libby vs. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission

contains a clarification of the proper subject matter for collective
bargaining and the exercise of management. rights. The case involved a dispute over a decision made by the management of a
chain of farms that employed migrant workers for manual harvesting operations. The decision to convert to mechanical harvesting
methods was made for reasons of operational economy and efficiency and resulted in the elimination of numerous harvesting jobs. The
union representing the migrant workers alleged that Libby had
committed an unfair labor practice in refusing to bargain collectively concerning the change in methods. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld Libby's right to manage itself, saying that business
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors and
that managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control are not subject to collective bargaining, nor are management decisions changing the direction of a corporate enterprise
which involve a change in capital investment2
SAMPLE MANAGEMENT RIGHTS CLAUSE

The content of a management rights clause depends upon the
particular activities and operation of the particular government unit
involved. A management rights clause is negotiated, not written in
an ivory tower. Accordingly, any management rights clause extracted from existing labor agreements should be reviewed from
that perspective. An example of a recently negotiated "and highly
controversial" management rights clause is that negotiated between
Milwaukee County and its largest employee organization, District
Council 48, American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, in a two year contract covering the years 1971-72. This
management rights clause provides as follows:
The County of Milwaukee retains and reserves the sole right
to manage its affairs in accordance with all applicable laws,
ordinances, regulations and executive orders. Included in this
responsibility, but not limited thereto, is the right to determine the number, structure and location of departments and
Ibid. at 283.
Milwaukee County, Wis. General Ordinances 81.01 (1971) ; Milwaukee County
Board of Supervisors Journal of Proceedings 43-61 (Jan. 19, 1971).
27 Cudahy, Wis., Ordinance No. 908 (1971).
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divisions, the kinds and number of services to be performed;
the right to determine the number of positions and the classifications thereof to perform such services; the right to direct
the work force; the right to establish qualifications for hire,
to test and to hire, promote and retain employees; the right
to transfer and assign employes, subject to existing practices
and the terms of this agreement; the right, subject to civil
services procedures and the terms of this agreement related
thereto, to suspend, discharge, demote or take other disciplinary action and the right to release employes from duties because of lack of work or lack of funds; the right to maintain
efficiency of operations by determining the method, the
means and the personnel by which such operations are conducted and to take whatever actions are reasonable and necessary to carry out the duties of the various departments and
divisions.
In addition to the foregoing, the County reserves the right to
make reasonable rules and regulations relating to personnel
policy procedures and practices and matters relating to working conditions, giving due regard to the obligations imposed
by this agreement. However, the County reserves total discretion with respect to the function or mission of the various
departments and divisions, the budget, organization, or the
technology of performing the work. These rights shall not be
abridged or modified except as specifically provided for by
the terms of this agreement, nor shall they be exercised for
the purpose of frustrating or modifying the terms of this
agreement. But these rights shall not be used for the purpose
of discriminating against any employe
or for the purpose of
2
discrediting or weakening the Union.

Another example of a management rights clause negotiated
with public employees is that negotiated as part of a two (2) year
contract between the City of Cudahy and Local 1801, International
Association of Fire Fighters. This clause reads as follows:
The City possesses the sole right to operate City government and all management rights repose in it, but such rights
must be exercised consistently with the other provisions of
contract. These rights which are normally exercised by the
Fire Chief include, but are not limited to, the following:
A. To direct all operations of City Government.
B. To hire, promote, transfer, assign and retain employees
in positions with the City and to suspend, demote, discharge, and take other disciplinary action against employees pursuant to the reasonable rules and regulations of
the Cudahy Fire and Police Commission.
C. To relieve employees from their duties because of lack
of work or for other legitimate reasons.
D. To maintain efficiency of City Government operation entrusted to it.
E. To introduce new or improved methods or facilities.
28 Note 23, supra.
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F. To change existing methods or facilities.
G. To contract out for goods or services.
H. To determine the methods, means and personnel by which
such operations are to be conducted.
I. To take whatever action which must be necessary to carry
out the functions of the City in situations of emergency.
J. To take whatever action is necessary to comply with State
or Federal Law.
The Association and the employees agree that they will not
attempt to abridge these management rights and the City
agrees it will not use these management rights to interfere
with rights established under this agreement. Nothing in this
agreement shall be construed as imposing an obligation upon
the City to consult or29negotiate concerning the above areas of
discretion and policy.

DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES TO REsoLvE DISPUTES

Each municipality should consider and evaluate specific steps it
is willing to undertake to avoid disastrous municipal labor consequences. After all reasonable collective bargaining techniques have
been explored, consideration should be given to mediation, fact
finding and/or advisory arbitration. If all these procedures are unsuccessful, any municipality may be faced with a walk-out or strike.
Such situations require a comprehensive strike plan. Although
municipalities are reluctant to talk about this subject, most responsible municipal employers who provide critical municipal services have established procedures of this type to insure the continuation of services in the event of an emergency"°
CONCLUSION

One of the ironic features of public employee bargaining
at the local level is the fact that it endangers the claim of municipalities that they administer government programs more efficiently
than the federal or state government. The municipality which cannot efficiently manage itself is in no position to assume greater
program responsibilities. The task ahead for local government units
therefore is difficult and challenging. The already rampant erosion
of management rights of municipal government must be halted.
Creative and progressive strategy that can be employed to reverse
the effects of improvident planning, inept negotiation and administration, aggressive union attempts to manage and largely unfavorable judicial and quasi-judicial decisions must be encouraged. If the
desired creativity and necessary experience cannot be rapidly developed within government, professional vision and implementation
must be acquired to insure that the answer to the question "Who
will manage municipal government?" remains "the elected government."

